Skip to content
omnism.si

Climate movement · Compare this tradition with another

Post-wave Politics

no name given · Bill McKibben – The Crucial Years · 2026-11-07 · Source

This text has not been analysed yet.

Show the full text
That’s the Lorax, filling out an early ballot at a Kansas polling station ahead of this week’s midterms. (Lorax politics did well in the Sunflower State!) At 2 p.m. this afternoon the Senate Democratic caucus meets to talk about the big “permitting reform” bill that is supposed to be voted on next week. That meeting is a reflection of pre-election politics, when the GOP had all the power; it will be held in the wake of Stephen Miller’s appointment as prime minister yesterday, which effectively ends the week of good feelings that came from the election. I’m going to write about permitting reform in a minute—but damnit, I refuse to surrender so quickly the long and beautiful night of the election. So many worked so hard not to savor it. Sometime around midnight on Tuesday I could suddenly feel a great soft weariness—not sleepiness, I was fully wired and hope-scrolling with the best of them, but instead a kind of welcome fatigue settling into my bones. Partly it was an after-effect of the fall’s endless travel back and forth across the country to organize with my Third Act colleagues, but there was something more. I think some part of me was relaxing for the first time since election night 2024, some part of me that had been tensed up against the constant assault of ugliness, cruelty and stupidity that has marked this grotesque period. Tuesday was…wonderful. Americans just spit out the poison. It turns out, thank heaven, that most people didn’t like the division and hate, the corruption and the constant provocation. It doesn’t end the problem, of course—Trump and his crew remain firmly in power. It will take another election to remedy that, and even then there’s much that may never be fixed—the world’s opinion of our country, for one; the scientific and educational systems broken for the sheer delight of anti-intellectual vandalism; the lives ended or ruined by deportations; the time lost in the climate fight. But at least the spell has broken. So, on the other side, let’s talk about permitting reform, and today’s Democratic caucus meeting. Because the bill’s proponents are trying to rush it through, that meeting will be taken up with talk of “manager’s amendments” to fix technical clauses. But that’s not the fundamental problem. I hope this newsletter has been a relatively steady branch to lean on these last two years, and I hope it will be for the next. If you can afford, without financial strain, to take out a modestly priced and voluntary subscription, then thank you! Permitting reform, you will recall, is the rubric for a 417 page piece of legislation officially known as the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, or BAAJA. It was announced last month by two Democratic Senators (Sheldon Whitehouse and Martin Heinrich) and two of their GOP counterparts, and fashioned as a grand bargain that would give both Big Oil and Biggish Cleantech some of what they each want, essentially by making it much easier to build stuff: electric transmission corridors, gas pipelines, you name it. And it largely does this by allowing them to sidestep environmental laws that opponents have used to slow projects down. It is, in essence, legislation derived from the argument in Abundance, Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s bestseller about the need to make it easier to build. I am largely persuaded by their argument—and heartened, for instance, to see YIMBY’s ablest legislative advocate, Scott Wiener, winning Nancy Pelosi’s old seat in Congress. It is much too hard to build stuff we badly need—housing, transit, energy. But in the case of energy there’s a problem, and that problem (as so often) is climate change. Building more housing produces…more housing. But if you take climate change seriously, you have to build more clean energy and less dirty energy, or otherwise you don’t get anywhere. And so the relevant questions about BAAJA are: what does it give up, and what does it produce? These have become at least a little clearer over the last few weeks as analysts have dug into the byzantine text. So—What does it give up? Quite a bit, as you would expect—it is, after all, a compromise with the Republicans, who at the time the bill was drafted were the majority in both the House and Senate, and with the White House, which still holds cards. David Bookbinder, former chief climate counsel at the Sierra Club who has helped argue crucial cases before the Supreme Court, compiled a long list , but it begins like this: It makes fossil fuel infrastructure permitting even easier than it has already become, binds future administrations to the energy permitting policies of the Trump administration, seriously weakens the Clean Water Act, and effectively repeals the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act. Those are the things the bill means to give away—they’re the stuff the oil industry wants. But as it turns out, the people drafting the bill on Democrats’ side (a tiny crew, since Whitehouse and Heinrich were telling no one negotiations were underway) managed to make some drafting errors that one analyst after another has noted give away even more than they probably intended to. Bookbinder argues that Title IV of the bill, “Project Certainty,” “beggars belief.” It effectively insulates not only the construction, but “the operation at full capacity” of all existing fossil fuel infrastructure from any future regulatory action of any sort. That means, for example, no increased stringency in federal environmental regulatory requirements under any statute – the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, etc. can ever be applied to such projects. But it goes well beyond that – the clause barring the federal government from “tak[ing] any other action to interfere with or prevent” construction or operation means these facilities are immune from enforcement of any federal law that would “interfere with” the construction or “operation at full capacity” of any such infrastructure. (Nor is this provision limited to fossil fuel infrastructure; it applies just as well to steel mills, highways, etc.) In other words, a single federal permit or authorization under any one federal law effectively immunizes that project from adverse effects from changes in (1) that federal law; (2) any other federal environmental law; and (3) any federal law at all. Lots of people—not just environmentalists—are worried about these provisions. For instance, the organizations fighting new detention centers for immigrants put out a call to action saying it would effectively eliminate the very tools communities have used to fight detention expansion in states including Arizona, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, and Texas. Taking them away would leave communities with fewer ways to stop new facilities and challenge the harm they cause. The same logic applies to data centers. EarthJustice, the most important nonprofit law firm for the planet, has been putting out a series of reports explaining exactly how their drive to slow data center expansion, and with it a truly enormous spread of natural gas turbines, would be impacted. First they have an October report calculating just how much gas is lurking out there that might be hooked up Building on work from Global Energy Monitor , the Environmental Integrity Project , and Cleanview , we estimate that gas will power approximately 80% of energy generation from BYOP projects coming online in the next five years. In total, we identify 177 GW of planned gas capacity, equivalent to 23% of the entire U.S.’s peak demand in 2025 and enough to power 65% of all U.S. homes. And then on Thnursday EarthJustice president Abigail Dillen (who you can see in action on David Fenton’s podcast ) put out a powerful account of what will happen to anyone’s ability to block any of this: With its extremely targeted provisions for gas pipelines, BAAJA delivers a precision strike for developers of dirty data centers. Here’s the package: gutting federal environmental review , including an outright exclusion for pipeline expansions, rubber-stamping permits under the Clean Water Act, blocking interference from States and Tribes , and prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions and other meaningful remedies. What this combination gives to the gas industry is an ultra fast-track for new and expanded gas pipelines that is insulated from court challenges and the kind of public opposition to data centers that is now expanding to associated pipeline projects. As she points out, the timing couldn’t be worse: Why does the fast-track matter so much? Some of the industry’s biggest players are poised to bring gas from hubs like the Marcellus Shale and the Permian Basin to fuel bigger and bigger data center complexes with gas. From the perspective of AI hyperscalers, piping in gas for on-site power is the fastest, cheapest path to lock in power on a timeline and on terms that are most in their control. The only risk they have now is reliable gas capacity. BAAJA’s pipeline package would solve that problem for them immediately, sealing many deals that would enable the dirtiest version of the data center build-out to move even faster, while the transmission provisions that could enable more clean energy will take years. That’s what you give up to get this deal. It’s a lot. It more or less means laying down most of the tools that we’ve used over the years to markedly improve the nation’s environment. But—the biggest threat to that environment now is the rapid heating underway on planet earth, and the only scalable tool we have to slow that down is the even-more-rapid deployment of clean energy, as long as it displaces dirty energy. You could argue that it’s therefore worth it to give up those hard-won things if it produces a real return. So—what do we get in return? This bill is extraordinarily complex, and therefore hard to model, especially on the tight deadlines imposed by the decision to push it through in the lame duck session. But the benefits are real, especially in making it easier to build the electric transmission corridors badly needed to bring clean power long distances. (It’s possible that need is lessening a bit as we get better at deploying batteries, but it’s still important). The question is, what kind of change will it produce? And the answers are…uninspiring. Some modelers—Kevin Kircher at Purdue, say— forecast that it will actually increase greenhouse gas emissions With at least 75% probability in this modeling framework, BAAJA increases all of the following: Revenues and jobs in both clean electricity and fossil fuel industries, with larger increases for fossil fuels; domestic energy-related greenhouse gas emissions; domestic mortality attributable to air pollution from fossil fuels; and fossil fuel exports That is a depressing forecast. But let’s make the very best argument that one can, the one that the bill’s proponents have been hailing. That comes from modelers at the Rhodium Group, who tried to figure out how the interlocking parts of the bill would work. They left some things out—for instance the very likely increase in exported natural gas, which, no matter where it’s burned still ends up in our shared atmosphere (and if you want to hear a few choice words about BAJAA and LNG, here is my old friend Roishetta Ozane, telling some home truths from Louisiana)—but even so here is the conclusion they came to, as explained by Robinson Meyer and Emily Pontecorvo at Heatmap: In the best case scenario, the bill could cut U.S. economy-wide emissions by 4%, reduce energy bills by $78 per year, and drive more than 200 gigawatts of new clean energy capacity by 2040, compared to status quo policy. In a worst case scenario, greenhouse gas emissions would remain unchanged on their current trajectory. Read that again. Over the next fifteen years, the absolutely crucial years for anything we’re planning to do to rein in climate change, this bill will do…essentially nothing. And, just as bad, as we’ve seen above, it will essentially lock in “doing nothing.” Bottom line: if what this bill’s proponents envision comes true, then America will not have slowed the heating of the planet over the next 15 years. Since the rest of the world is on a very different course, the U.S. will be a massive outlier. Here’s what it looks like on a graph. The light blue line is where we need to go under the Paris accords. The dark blue, green, and purple lines are where the Rhodium Group’s different scenarios project we’re going, and the dotted lines are where we’re going with BAAJA. If you say to yourself “they’re almost exactly the same,” then you’ve figured out the problem. If this bill simply mandated those reductions, without destroying environmental laws, it would still be a painful idea. But since we get essentially nothing and give up an awful lot, it’s like the kind of trade that sixth graders pull off on their four-year-old brothers the day after Halloween: “this box of Milk Duds has eight pieces in it, so you should give me eight Reeses cups. And I’ll throw in this Charleston Chew.” All of this is made worse by the third factor here, which is the timing. When negotiators put the grand bargain together, we were still in a world ruled by Donald Trump and the GOP, and Whitehouse and Heinrich regarded this as the best possible deal that could be made. But now we’ve had the biggest single shift in political power in this country since the post-Watergate year of 1974. We don’t know all the factors that drove that great victory—disgust with the Trump regime above all, I think. But one of its distinctive factors was revulsion at data centers. People had many reasons to oppose them, from water use to energy prices to fear of AI to disgust with oligarchs. But they only had one way to oppose them, which were the set of laws BAAJA sets out to sideline. There seem to have been forty ballot measures around the country to restrict data centers, and 39 of them appear to have passed. As Abigail Dillen noted, to the degree that we can discern anything about voter’s views on rapidly cleaning up our energy system, they’re in favor: Democrats won control of the Georgia Public Service Commission and appear to have won two seats on the Arizona Corporation Commission, narrowing the Republican majority from 5-0 to 3-2. In Texas, Democrats won a seat on the Railroad Commission, which regulates the oil and gas industry. With these seats, there is an opportunity to usher in clean energy for people who are struggling with soaring energy costs. These were the opposite of sleepy races: Voters are understanding the connection between data centers, utility rates, and regulatory bodies. And, in the midst of a rush to drill more oil and gas and entrench our fossil fuel dependence, voters rejected a ballot measure to establish a constitutional “right to gas” in Colorado, a major oil-and-gas-producing state. The oil and gas industry presented voters with a false choice between prosperity and policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Voters know better. As Emily Atkin pointed out, “the U.S. oil and gas industry spent at least $182 million trying to elect Republicans in last night’s midterm elections,” second only to the AI barons. Hell, in the single most expensive House race in the entire country, the oil and gas industry threw everything they had at young Will Lawrence, a founder of the Sunrise Movement, and he beat the incumbent and flipped the seat. As Atkin points out In perhaps the most stunning blue flip in Texas, Democrat Jon Rosenthal won the race to oversee the Texas Railroad Commission , the agency that oversees the state’s massive oil and gas industry—and his did it despite his Republican opponent receiving $1.8 million from oil-linked donors . While Rosenthal hardly portrays himself as a climate champion, he’s campaigned on ending routine flaring and venting, requiring modern leak detection, and enforcing pollution rules. So maybe it wouldn’t be the best idea to hand data center proponents an immediate win. If you wonder, by the way, how the AI industry and its hydrocarbon enablers think about BAAJA, the Revolving Door Project has a helpful catalogue of their reactions, which basically boil down to—”please and thank you.” Here’s the Williams pipeline company: “AI, electrification and the onshoring of manufacturing are creating unprecedented growth in power demand. […] We need to build the power facilities and linear infrastructure necessary to meet this growth or we will surely fall behind. And America’s energy security depends on our ability to supply our allies with American natural gas.” In the face of all that, BAAJA’s proponents have started talking less about emissions reductions and more about “affordability,” arguing that it will reduce utility costs. Sadly, As Kate Aronoff points out, the same Rhodium Group modeling indicates that the savings for an average savings by 2040 of somewhere around (it seems to be the magic number) 4 percent compared with what they would have been without the law. If you think it’s just tired old environmentalists saying this, take it from this tired old environmentalist: people sprightlier than me are saying the same thing. Jared Huffman, for instance, who will be running environmental policy in the House after the Democrats take control of the chamber in January. He was responding, the day after the election, to Chuck Schumer’s promise that it would not be a “supplicant Senate” that Trump now faces. The first chance to show that the days of Trump's "supplicant Senate" are over is Nov. 9th. Dems can demand a hearing and amendments to improve the deeply flawed BAAJA bill before it moves forward. Or, they can cave to Trump and agree to jam through his 400-page MAGA wish list - the most sweeping environmental/energy bill in decades - without a single hearing. If that happens after last night's Blue Tsunami, the word "supplicant" would be far too kind. The bill’s proponents know that it’s in trouble—the Sierra Club, for instance, came out against it yesterday. Hakeem Jeffries said last night that the bill needed attention from the House—but he focused on relatively small issues with tribes and National Environmental Policy Act provisions that presumably can be sanded behind closed doors, without resolving the larger problems. That may work, or it may not. As Keith Goldberg at Law360 reported , DC energy lobbyists, even on the fossil fuel side, aren’t sure. One, Scott Segal, noted what I was saying above about data centers: “You’ve got an increasing realization that the second section of the bill is somewhat in service to data centers..an issue that was at play in the midterm elections.” Look, all of this is hard, and only the oil companies and their harem of politicians have bad intentions; Sheldon Whitehouse and Martin Heinrich are trying to be of service, and they’re navigating a political landscape that suddenly shifted. (Partly thanks to them—by most accounts Whitehouse was one of the people who recruited Mississippi’s Scott Colom to run for the Senate!) We definitely need ways to build out more energy; abundance, all things equal, is abundant! But we also need ways to honor and harness the political energy unleashed on Tuesday, a vital force that we don’t yet fully understand. My bottom line: I desperately don’t want to get to 2040 (and here I use the metaphorical I, since 2040 is pushing my lifespan) and find that our emissions have gone down a measly four percent. I think that if this deal had been made thirty years ago, it might have made sense—we’d be reaping the benefits now. But the fossil fuel industry made sure we didn’t. And this bill, which they’re backing with great enthusiasm, seems an awful lot like a hedge to make sure they can string their business model out for a few more decades—a way to lock in the fruits of their decades of political obstructionism. Gambling on someth